The Supreme Court, Political Questions, and Article V - A Case for Judicial Restraint by Millet, Thomas
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 23 | Number 3 Article 2
1-1-1983
The Supreme Court, Political Questions, and
Article V - A Case for Judicial Restraint
Thomas Millet
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Thomas Millet, The Supreme Court, Political Questions, and Article V - A Case for Judicial Restraint, 23 Santa Clara L. Rev. 745
(1983).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol23/iss3/2
THE SUPREME COURT, POLITICAL
QUESTIONS, AND ARTICLE V-A CASE FOR
JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
Thomas Millet*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the time of Marbury v. Madison,1 the Supreme
Court has exercised the power to review the constitutionality
of actions of Congress and the President. Through the exer-
cise of the authority "to say what the law is,"' the Supreme
Court has assumed the role of the ultimate arbiter of the
meaning of the Constitution. In exercising this power of judi-
cial review, however, the Court has also fashioned several lim-
itations on its role. Generally, these limitations stem from the
Court's interpretation of article III's requirement that litiga-
tion must involve an actual case or controversy. Thus, the
Court has limited its power to say what the law is by inter-
preting article III to preclude consideration of cases which are
not ripe, s cases which are moot,4 or cases where the plaintiff
lacks standing.5 Another limitation on judicial review, the po-
litical question doctrine, is one that is self-imposed. It is
unique because it derives not from article III's limitations onjudicial power, but from the Court's recognition of its consti-
tutional role as but one of three co-equal branches of govern-
ment in a system of separated powers.'
Where power is separated in any system of government,
tension, of course, exists among the centers of that power.
© 1983 by Thomas Millet
* Trial Attorney, Federal Programs Branch, Civil Division, United States De-
partment of Justice. J.D., Notre Dame Law School; B.A., University of Maryland.
The views contained in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessa-
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1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. Id. at 176.
3. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
4. DeFunis v. Odergaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
5. Association of Data Processors v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1973).
6. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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When one repository of that power exercises it to review the
actions of another branch of government, as with the exercise
of judicial review, that tension becomes manifest. Perhaps no-
where is that tension greater than in cases where the Supreme
Court's judicial review power is invoked to review the actions
undertaken in article V's constitutional amendment process.'
This tension is created by the nature of judicial review itself
and the purpose of article V.
In exercising judicial review and in interpreting the Con-
stitution, the Supreme Court adds meaning to the words of
the Constitution. In a real sense, its decisions on constitu-
tional issues are as much a part of the Constitution as the
words of the document itself.
The Court's constitutional interpretations can be changed
in only two ways. First, the Court can, in later cases, modify
or overrule its prior decisions. Second, those decisions may be
overruled in the political processes established by article V.8
The former method necessarily presupposes active judicial in-
volvement. The latter method does not and is totally non-ju-
dicial, unless the Court is requested to rule on the legality of
some aspect of the amendment process. When the Court is
faced with an article V case, it must reconcile the polar con-
cepts of judicial review and the constitutional power of other
branches and levels of government to assert authority to
amend the Constitution, including the Court's interpretations
of the Constitution. In such cases, tension thus exists between
the Supreme Court's role to interpret the Constitution, its
duty to say what the law is, and its role as a coordinate
branch of government in a system of separated powers.
Judicial resolution of article V cases can have only three
7. U.S. CONST. art. V provides:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it neces-
sary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or on the Applica-
tion of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a
Convention, which in either case, shall be valid to all Intents and Pur-
poses, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of
three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths
thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed
by the Congress ....
8. Prime examples of this latter method are the eleventh amendment, overrul-
ing Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (1 Dall.) 419 (1793); the proposed Child Labor
Amendment, cf., Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247
U.S. 251 (1918); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922); and the now-
expired Equal Rights Amendment, cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1977).
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results. First, the Court can serve to legitimize the actions of
the political branch by upholding its constitutional authority
to do the acts in question. In such cases, the Court's resolu-
tion prevents any present conflict with another part of the
federal government by resolving the controversy in favor of
that other branch. By addressing the issues at all, however,
the Court can create the potential for a future conflict. Its de-
cisions are used to measure the legality of future actions and
therefore limit the authority of Congress, the states, and the
public to exercise various options in amending the Constitu-
tion. Second, the Court can find the amendment process, and
perhaps an amendment itself, defective in some manner,
thereby thwarting amending efforts. Either of these results
poses serious questions concerning the legitimacy of judicial
review. By exercising review over article V cases, the Supreme
Court retains not only control over the judicial process of con-
stitutional amendment through overruling past cases, but also
control over the non-judicial amendment process of article V.
Potentially, the Supreme Court's ability to say what the law is
would be unchecked, a result at odds with the constitutional
concept of a republican government of separated powers.
A third result is possible, however. Instead of resolving
disputes over the amendment process, the Court can utilize
the judicial rules of self-restraint, such as the limitations on
justiciability created by the Court's interpretation of article
III's case or controversy limitations. Indeed, the Supreme
Court recently employed this method. The Court dismissed as
moot a case involving the power of Congress to extend the rat-
ification period for the Equal Rights Amendment ("ERA")
and the ability of the states to rescind their prior ratifica-
tions." Alternatively the Court can acknowledge the authority
of other branches and levels of government to also add to the
meaning of the Constitution by applying the political question
doctrine to article V cases, as it has done on one prior
occasion.10
The Supreme Court's treatment of article V cases, begin-
ning with the first amendment adopted under article V11 and
culminating with the now-defunct ERA, 2 reveals that the
9. Carmen v. Idaho, 103 S. Ct. 22 (1982).
10. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
11. 3 U.S. (1 Dall.) 379 (1798).
12. Carmen v. Idaho, 103 S. Ct. 22 (1982).
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Court has never been willing to precipitate a conflict with an-
other branch of government in the area of article V. Instead,
the Court's practice has been one of avoiding conflict, first
through legitimization and then through judicial restraint.
This article traces the history of the Court's views on article V
and focuses on the political question doctrine and the justifi-
cation for its application in article V cases.
II. THE FIRST PHASE-LEGITIMIZATION
Although several article V cases have been decided by the
Supreme Court, at no time has the Court ever exercised its
power of judicial review to invalidate an amendment or any
step taken by Congress in the amendment process. To the
contrary, on those occasions when it has addressed the merits,
the Supreme Court has consistently upheld congressional au-
thority in article V. In Professor Black's terms, the Court's
role has consistently been one of legitimization."s Never has
the Court expressly performed the converse role of checking
congressional action.
Interestingly enough, the trend of legitimization began
with the first amendment adopted under article V and the
first article V case to reach the Supreme Court. In Chisholm
v. Georgia,14 the Court held that citizens of one state were not
barred by sovereign immunity from suing another state. Re-
acting quickly to this decision, Congress proposed, and the
states ratified, the eleventh amendment to bar such suits."5 In
proposing the amendment, however, Congress did not present
it to the President for approval." In Hollingsworth v. Vir-
ginia,17 the petitioner argued that the failure to present the
proposed amendment to the President for approval or veto in-
validated it. The Supreme Court, with no real explanation, ac-
13. C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 34 (1960).
14. 2 U.S. (1 Dall.) 419 (1793).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. XI reads: "The judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States, by citizens of another state, or by citizens or sub-
jects of any foreign state."
16. Under the Presentment Clause of article I, section 7, "every order, resolu-
tion, or vote, to which the concurrence of the senate and house of representatives may
be necessary ... shall be presented to the president of the United States; and ...
shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed [by two-
thirds of both houses]."
17. 3 U.S. (1 Dall.) 379 (1798).
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cepted the validity of the eleventh amendment.'
The Supreme Court was not faced with another article V
case until 1920. Again, however, the Court's exercise of judi-
cial review extended only to legitimize completed amendment
procedures against an effort to overturn an already ratified
amendment. In Hawke v. Smith, No. 1,19 and Hawke v.
Smith, No. 2,20 the Court considered whether the constitution
of the state of Ohio could lawfully require that federal consti-
tutional amendments be ratified through a binding popular
referendum rather than through action of the state legislature,
as prescribed by Congress under its article V power to desig-
nate the mode of ratification.2 1 Contrary to the state constitu-
tion, the Ohio legislature ratified the eighteenth 2  and nine-
teenth amendments 2  without submission of those
amendments to popular vote. The Supreme Court found that,
under article V, designation of the mode of ratification "is left
to the choice of Congress."2 According to the Court, the
states had no inherent power to depart from Congress' choice;
state power to ratify amendments "derives its authority from
the Federal Constitution to which the State and its people
have alike assented. 28
A few months later, the Court again addressed the eight-
eenth amendment in the National Prohibition Cases.2 6 Per-
sons charged with violating prohibition laws challenged, inter
alia, the power of Congress to propose an amendment by a
two-thirds majority of a voting quorum of each house, rather
than by a two-thirds vote of the entire membership of each
house. They also asserted that article V did not permit the
adoption of amendments relating to public health and safety,
but only to the structure of government. The Court upheld
18. The Court's judgment merely indicated that the amendment was "constitu-
tionally adopted." Id. at 382. The reporter's notes indicate that Justice Chase, during
argument, expressed the view that the president's veto applies only to legislation and
that he has no role in the amendment process. Id. at 380 n.(a).
19. 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
20. 253 U.S. 231 (1920).
21. See supra note 7.
22. The eighteenth amendment banned the sale, manufacture, and transporta-
tion of intoxicating liquors.
23. The nineteenth amendment extended suffrage to women.
24. 253 U.S. at 226.
25. Id. at 230.
26. 253 U.S. 350 (1920).
27. Other issues examining the preemptive effect of the eighteenth amendment
19831 749
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Congress' action in proposing the amendment by two-thirds
majorities of the voting quorums. It also found that the
amendment itself was within the power of Congress to pro-
pose. Reminiscent of its disposition in Hollingsworth, the ma-
jority opinion of Justice Van Devanter included only the
Court's conclusions, not its reasoning.
28
In these first three cases, the Court exercised its judicial
review role, but did so in a manner which resulted in approval
of the actions of Congress. It performed Professor Black's
legitimization function.2 By merely exerting authority to re-
view the cases, the Court created the possibility for conflict
with Congress. By legitimizing congressional action, however,
present conflict was avoided.
Of the three cases, tension between judicial review and
the separation of powers was greatest in Hollingsworth, be-
cause the eleventh amendment was plainly intended to re-
verse the Court's previous decision in Chisholm v. Georgia.
Actual conflict was avoided through legitimizing the amend-
ment process by finding the eleventh amendment valid de-
spite Congress' failure to submit the proposal to the President
for approval. Indeed, the Court's decision to affirm Congress'
action without a written opinion also lessened the possibility
of future conflict. Similarly, the Court's simple announcement
of its conclusions in the National Prohibition Cases, uphold-
ing both the amendment procedures and substance of the
eighteenth amendment, lessened the potential for conflict.
The Court legitimized congressional actions without disclosing
a rationale which could be interpreted to limit congressional
power in the future.
Hawke presented no conflict with congressional judg-
ments, but only an issue of state power. In protecting the pri-
macy of federal authority, the Court was perhaps less con-
strained by notions of its role as a coordinate branch of
government. The beginnings of a concept important to the
Court's decisions in later cases emerged in Hawke, however.
In commenting upon Congress' authority to require ratifica-
tion through state legislatures, the Supreme Court noted that
and the interpretation of the amendment itself, not relevant to the amendment pro-
cess, were also presented. Id. at 386-88. An additional issue, concerning state ratifica-
tion through referendum was foreclosed by the Supreme Court decision in Hawke.
28. See id. at 384; id. at 388 (White, C.J., concurring).
29. See supra note 13.
[Vol. 23750
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that method had been used for all amendments adopted to
that point. 0 As will be shown later, the use of historic and
congressional precedent became important to the Court in its
transition from legitimization to restraint.
III. THE SECOND PHASE-LEGITIMIZATION THROUGH DEFER-
ENCE-THE BEGINNINGS OF JUDICIAL RESTRAINT
The eighteenth and nineteenth amendments continued to
be the source of litigation for the Supreme Court. From 1921
to 1931, the Court decided cases involving both of these
amendments. Its decisions mark a turning point, however. In
deciding these cases, the Court began to explicitly recognize
congressional action as precedent and to explicitly defer to
congressional judgments and authority.
Shortly after its decision in the National Prohibition
Cases, the Supreme Court again faced a challenge to the
eighteenth amendment in Dillon v. Gloss.3 1 This time, a per-
son arrested for violating federal prohibition laws sought
habeas corpus relief, and challenged the authority of Congress
to limit the ratification period for an amendment to seven
years.32 Justice Van Devanter, writing for the Court, held that
amendments must be ratified within a reasonable time after
proposal by Congress, but that Congress may decide what that
reasonable time period shall be when proposing an amend-
ment. According to Justice Van Devanter, ratification must be
"a decisive expression of the people's will."33 To be a decisive
expression, state ratifications "must be sufficiently contempo-
raneous in that number of states to reflect the will of the peo-
ple in all sections at relatively the same period."3 4 Having
thus established a standard of reasonableness, Justice Van
Devanter went on to find that Congress could fix a reasonable
time at the outset as part of its power to designate the mode
of ratification "so that all may know what it is."1
Dillon displays an interesting blend of judicial review and
judicial restraint. In deciding that proposal and ratification
30. 253 U.S. at 227.
31. 256 U.S. 368 (1921).
32. Prior to the eighteenth amendment, no ratification period had been speci-
fied by Congress for any proposed amendment. Id. at 371-72.
33. Id. at 374.
34. Id. at 375.
35. Id. at 376.
1983]
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must occur within a reasonable time, the Court opened the
door to judicial review of the reasonableness of the ratification
period. Justice Van Devanter pointed to three proposed con-
stitutional amendments which, at that time, had been pending
for nearly a century or more and intimated that these amend-
ments would not be valid if ratified after such a long period. 6
The qualified opening for judicial review of the reasona-
bleness of the ratification period contained inherent mecha-
nisms to assure a minimal amount of conflict with Congress or
the public. Indeed, this opening was confined to cases where
the Court could safely rule without fear of congressional or
popular backlash. If, for example, the Supreme Court were to
hold today that the amendment proposed in 1810 banning for-
eign titles of nobility for American citizens8 7 was no longer
open for ratification, as suggested by the Dillon Court,38 pub-
lic reaction would probably be more amused than angered. In
Dillon, where the question was a closer one, however, the
Court deferred to Congress' judgment in establishing a ratifi-
cation period at the outset.
In short, the Dillon Court assumed the authority to re-
view the reasonableness of the ratification period only in cases
where the time period since proposal was so great that popu-
lar interest would have died and the Court's ruling would not
be controversial. In closer cases, where the time period was
not clearly unreasonable, it indicated that it would defer to
Congress. In Dillon, the Court combined legitimization, by
upholding Congress' power to establish a ratification period,
with deference to Congress' judgment on what period was
reasonable.
The nineteenth amendment returned to the Supreme
Court in Leser v. Garnett,9 a challenge by state voters to the
federal government's ability to extend suffrage to women in
the state without the state's consent. Such a great change in
the electorate, argued the voters, required the state's con-
36. Id. at 372. These proposed amendments concerned the compensation of
members of Congress, the apportionment of Representatives, and titles of nobility.
See House Doc. No. 353, 54th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 300, 317, 320, 329 (1896). A
fourth proposal, preserving the institution of slavery, was effectively defeated by the
thirteenth amendment. 256 U.S. at 372. All other then-proposed amendments had
been ratified. Id.
37. Resolution of Jan. 12, 1810, Ch. 50, 2 Stat. 613 (1810).
38. 256 U.S. at 372.
39. 258 U.S. 130 (1922).
[Vol. 23752
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sent.'0 Additionally, they asserted that ratification of the
nineteenth amendment violated several state constitutions;
two ratifications, those of Tennessee and West Virginia, were
invalid under state procedural laws. For Justice Brandeis,
writing for the Court, the issue was relatively simple. If the
petitioners' theory was correct, then serious doubts would be
cast upon the validity of the fifteenth amendment, extending
the vote to black males, which had "been recognized and
acted on for half of a century" at that time." To have agreed
with the petitioners would thus have meant not only thwart-
ing the actions of Congress, the states, and the public in rati-
fying the nineteenth amendment, but it would also have
meant vitiating the effectiveness of a long-standing amend-
ment. Justice Brandeis refused to consider the issue, saying
that "[tihe suggestion that the Fifteenth was incorporated in
the Constitution, not in accordance with law, ...cannot be
entertained. '42
By following historic precedent, rather than reviewing the
merits of the issue, the Court effectively avoided a ruling
which could have invalidated two amendments at once and
engendered a considerable hostile reaction by Congress, the
states, and the public. By implication, the Court also accepted
Congress' judgment that article V permitted it to propose
amendments affecting the composition of the electorate and
to enforce those amendments in states which had not ratified
them. The Court could just as easily have held, without refer-
ence to the fifteenth amendment, that all the states agreed to
be bound by amendments adopted under article V when they
accepted the Constitution. Instead, the Court looked to Con-
gress' past actions on the fifteenth amendment to decide
Leser. The decision thus displayed a blend of legitimization
and deference to Congress' judgments.
As in Hawke, however, the Leser Court was willing to ex-
ert judicial review over assertions of state power. It found that
state constitutional limitations had no effect on the ability of
40. Petitioners were a group of qualified voters from Maryland, a state which
rejected the nineteenth amendment. Id. at 135-36. A similar challenge by voters of
the District of Columbia was dismissed for lack of standing in Fairchild v. Hughes,
258 U.S. 126 (1921). A Maryland statute, however, specifically gave Maryland voters
standing to challenge the registration of voters. Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922).
41. 258 U.S. at 136.
42. Id.
1983]
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a state to ratify an amendment to the federal Constitution.
Additionally, the Court found that the federal government
need not have looked behind the face of ratifications received
from the states to determine their validity. 43 On such ques-
tions, of course, the issue is one of federalism-federal versus
state power-not separation of powers within the federal
government.
The treatment of historic congressional precedent as
binding on the Supreme Court continued in United States v.
Sprague." There, persons charged with violating prohibition
laws argued that amendments affecting individual rights could
only be ratified through state conventions and not by the
state legislatures. The Court cited its earlier holding in Hawke
that article V allowed Congress alone the power to designate
the ratification mode. It went on, however, to point out that
the defendants' theory called into question the validity of the
thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, and nineteenth
Amendments, each of which affected individual rights and
each of which was ratified through action by state legisla-
tures.45 Again, the Court accepted Congress' prior judgments
and refused to consider invalidating six amendments at once.
Dillon, Leser, and Sprague indicate a transition in the
Supreme Court's article V analysis and its views on its own
role in the amendment process. The Court continued to legiti-
mize the steps in that process. For the first time, however, the
Court began to disclose reasoning which betrayed a willing-
ness to defer to congressional judgments in the amendment
process and a recognition of the consequences of disagreeing
with those judgments. In Leser and Sprague, the Court ex-
plicitly recognized that contrary rulings would have created
legal chaos by invalidating prior amendments. The Court was
unwilling to do so. In Dillon, the Court opened the door to
striking down an amendment which had lost vitality over
time, but did so in a manner unlikely to create a confronta-
tion. Rather, it expressly deferred to Congress' judgment con-
cerning the appropriate period for ratification. Taken to-
gether, these three cases set the stage for the application of
43. Id. at 137. Previously, the Supreme Court had summarily affirmed a deci-
sion by the District of Columbia Circuit, reaching the same result. United States ex
rel. Widenmann v. Hughes, 265 F. 998 (D.C. Cir. 1920), aff'd, 257 U.S. 619 (1921).
44. 282 U.S. 716 (1931).
45. Id. at 734.
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the political question doctrine to article V cases, which soon
followed.
IV. THE THIRD PHASE-JUDICIAL RESTRAINT THROUGH THE
POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE.
The trend toward deferral of article V questions to Con-
gress reached its peak seventeen years after Dillon when the
Supreme Court decided Coleman v. Miller."' Faced with the
questions of whether a state may ratify the Child Labor
Amendment after having already rejected it fifteen years after
its proposal, and whether the proposal remained alive despite
the time lapse, the Supreme Court held that the political
question doctrine applied to bar judicial consideration of the
issue. The Court reserved the question exclusively for
Congress.
On the issue of ratification following initial rejection by a
state, the Court once again looked to past congressional action
for precedent, as it had in Leser and Sprague. The Court
found that, with the fourteenth amendment, Congress had
counted states which ratified after initial rejections and states
which passed rescissions of prior ratifications as among those
states comprising the necessary three-fourths majority.47
Rather than raising doubts over the validity of the fourteenth
amendment, the Court, as in Leser and Sprague, chose to ac-
cept Congress' judgment on the issue. The Coleman Court
then went one step further. Not only did it defer to Congress'
judgment, but it also found that such issues were more appro-
priately decided by Congress. Thus, the Coleman Court la-
belled the issue a political one:
We think that in accordance with this historic precedent
the question of the efficacy of ratifications by state legis-
latures, in the light of previous rejection or attempted
withdrawal, should be regarded as a political question
pertaining to the political departments, with the ultimate
authority in the Congress in the exercise of its control
46. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
47. Three states, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia initially rejected
the fourteenth amendment. They later ratified, however, giving the amendment a
three-fourths majority. Two states, Ohio and New Jersey, then rescinded their prior
ratifications. Congress adopted a resolution declaring the amendment ratified, effec-
tively deciding the questions of rescission and ratification following rejection. Id. at
448-49.
19831 755
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over the promulgation of the adoption of the
amendment. 8
Concerning the question of whether the Child Labor
Amendment could still be ratified despite the lapse of time,
the Court recognized the opening for judicial review over the
reasonableness of the ratification period provided by its deci-
sion in Dillon. It, however, declined the opportunity to exer-
cise judicial review. Instead, it found that the issue of the rea-
sonableness of the ratification period involved considerations
more appropriately addressed by Congress:
[T]he question of a reasonable time in many cases would
involve, as in this case it does involve, an appraisal of a
great variety of relevant conditions, political, social and
economic, which can hardly be said to be within the ap-
propriate range of evidence receivable in a court of justice
and as to which it would be an extravagant extension of
judicial authority to assert judicial notice as the basis of
deciding a controversy with respect to the validity of an
amendment actually ratified. On the other hand, these
conditions are appropriate for the consideration of the
political departments of the Government. The questions
they involve are essentially political and not justiciable.' 9
Justice Black's concurring opinion went even further, finding
that "Congress has sole and complete control over the amend-
ing process, subject to no judicial review ...."50
The facts in Coleman presented the potential for direct
conflict with Congress, and the prevailing political climate was
one of hostility toward judicial activism. The Supreme Court
had just recently invalidated much of President Roosevelt's
New Deal legislation, prompting him to respond with his fa-
mous "Court-packing" scheme. 1
The Coleman facts and the political climate explain, at
least in part, why the Court went further in deferring to Con-
gress in Coleman than it had in previous cases. The case itself
was one which presented a high level of tension between judi-
cial review and separation of powers. Previously, in Bailey v.
48. Id. at 450.
49. Id. at 454.
50. Id. at 459.
51. The "Court-packing" plan was proposed in 1937, two years before the Cole-
man decision. E. ERIKSSON, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE NEW DEAL 4 (1940).
[Vol. 23
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Drexel Furniture 5 and Hammer v. Dagenhart,53 the Supreme
Court had found that congressional efforts to limit the use of
child labor were unconstitutional. "4 The Child Labor Amend-
ment would have overruled these decisions by giving Congress
the power to regulate or prohibit child labor." For the first
time since Hollingsworth, the Supreme Court was asked to
oversee the amendment process in the context of a proposed
amendment aimed at overruling the Court's prior constitu-
tional interpretation.
Given this background, it is hardly surprising that the
Coleman Court refrained from the conflict and invoked the
political question doctrine. If the Court had reviewed the case
on its merits and decided in favor of the petitioners on either
of the article V issues presented, it would have created serious
obstacles to ratification and possibly ended any hope of ulti-
mate ratification." In light of its recent controversies over
President Roosevelt's New Deal legislation, a hostile reaction
by the political branches and the public would have been
likely. 7
Moreover, by controlling the very process employed to
overrule the Court's interpretation of the Constitution, the
Court would have asserted ultimate authority to control and
interpret the Constitution. Congress and the public would
have been without recourse. The Court's dilemma in such
cases is compounded when this ultimate authority is asserted
by the least democratic branch of the federal government
against whom the sanction of the ballot box is not available.
The Court's powers become unchecked and, in the context of
52. 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
53. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
54. In Bailey, the court invalidated a federal tax on employers who utilized
child labor. In Hammer, the Court found a federal statute prohibiting commerce in
goods made by child labor to be unconstitutional.
55. The proposed amendment provided that "[tihe Congress shall have power
to limit, regulate, and prohibit the labor of persons under eighteen years of age."
Joint Resolution of June 7, 1924, ch. 379, 43 Stat. 670 (1924).
56. At the time of the decision in Coleman, ten of twenty-seven ratifying states
had ratified following initial rejections. P. STRUM, THE SUPREME COURT AND "POLITI-
CAL QUESTIONS": A STUDY IN JUDICIAL EVASION 106 (1974). Thus, a decision finding
that ratification could not follow rejection would have had drastic results for the
amendment.
57. One commentator explains Coleman's result entirely on this basis. See
Comment, Rescinding Ratification of Proposed Constitutional Amendments-A
Question for the Court, 37 LA. L. REV. 896, 913-14 (1977).
19831
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amendments, counter-majoritarian 8
Several views on the application of the political question
doctrine in article V cases have been advanced. One view is
that the doctrine should not apply and that the Supreme
Court should treat all article V cases as justiciable in order to
protect against an abuse of power by Congress. 9 While having
the virtue of consistency, this view fails to adequately deal
with the result in Coleman or the conflict between judicial re-
view and separation of powers in Coleman-like cases.
A second view, the "present conflict" view, first advanced
by Professor Scharpf60 and later cited by Justice Powell, 1
would apply the political question doctrine only in article V
cases where, as in Coleman, the underlying amendment would
reverse a decision of the Supreme Court. This view does re-
solve the conflict in Coleman-type situations. It, however, is
too narrow in scope because it fails to deal with questions of
either past or future conflicts. As shown above, the Supreme
Court has on several occasions accepted historic precedent
rather than legal precedent to resolve article V cases in order
to avoid invalidating amendments of long-standing, as well as
proposed or newly-adopted, amendments. The "present con-
flict" view of Professor Scharpf and Justice Powell does not
address the Court's history in dealing with these past con-
flicts. It also does not recognize that decisions in article V
cases can create conflicts by narrowing the powers of Con-
gress, the states, and the public to amend the Constitution in
the future.
A third view seeks to pick and choose among the possible
article V issues which may arise and allows the Court to adju-
dicate cases of clear abuse of power 62 or cases involving proce-
dural issues. s Whatever the merit of this view, no principled
58. Cf. P. STRUM, supra note 56; Comment, supra note 57.
59. This school fears a "parade of horribles" which could follow through an
abuse of article V power by Congress if the Supreme Court does not act as a check on
that authority. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 57, at 923-25. See also Black, The
Proposed Amendment of Article V: A Threatened Disaster, 72 YALE L.J. 957, 959
(1963).
60. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analy-
sis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 589 (1966).
61. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1001-02 n.2 (1979) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
62. P. STRUM, supra note 56, at 103.
63. L. ORFIELD, AMENDING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 21 (1971).
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manner exists to make such distinctions under article V.
The final view is, of course, that of Coleman itself. Cole-
man presented a case of past conflict with congressional ac-
tion over the fourteenth amendment and present conflict in
the Child Labor Amendment itself. The Coleman Court chose
to abstain entirely and leave the issues for resolution in the
political arena. It chose to abstain instead of legitimizing con-
gressional action, as it had always done up to that time, or
precipitating a confrontation during a time when the Court
was already under fire. This result removed all possibility of
conflict with amendment efforts and recognized the rights of
Congress, the states, and the public to override the Court's
views of the Constitution.
While the Supreme Court has not addressed any article V
cases on the merits since Coleman, it has considered the polit-
ical question doctrine on several occasions. It remains, then,
to determine the vitality of Coleman under the Supreme
Court's present view of the political question doctrine.
V. THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE TODAY
In 1962, the Supreme Court decided Baker v. Carr,"' a
case which remains the leading one on the political question
doctrine. In Baker, the Court held that the political question
doctrine does not bar an equal protection challenge to malap-
portionment in a state legislature. Unfortunately, the opinion
in Baker both clarified and confused the nature of the politi-
cal question doctrine and clouded its applicability to article V
cases.
One important aspect of the political question doctrine
clarified in Baker is the doctrine's source in the separation of
powers principle. As the court stated, the political question
doctrine "is primarily a function of the separation of pow-
ers."" It represents a self-imposed rule of restraint on the ex-
ercise of judicial review in recognition of the fact that certain
powers are committed exclusively to another branch of gov-
ernment. Thus, when a case involves a state power contro-
versy, the separation of powers is not involved and the politi-
cal doctrine is inapplicable: "[I]t is the relationship between
the judiciary and the coordinate branches of the Federal Gov-
64. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
65. Id. at 210.
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ernment, and not the federal judiciary's relationship to the
States, which gives rise to the 'political question.'""
While thus clarifiying one point,67 the Baker Court went
on to foster considerable confusion by outlining the earmarks
of political question cases:
It is apparent that several formulations which vary
slightly according to the settings in which the questions
arise may describe a political question, although each has
one or more elements which identify it as essentially a
function of the separation of powers. Prominent on the
surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commit-
ment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or
a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of govern-
ment; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to
a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.
Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from
the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non-jus-
ticiability on the ground of a political question's
presence."
The listing of the characteristics of political questions in
Baker has, unfortunately, served to confuse the doctrine's
true nature as an aspect of the separation of powers. Often,
analysts have engaged in the mechanistic ritual, applying
these characteristics as determinative factors, rather than de-
scriptive characteristics, in ascertaining the presence or ab-
sence of a political question. 9 Clearly, the Baker Court identi-
66. Id.
67. The recognition of the political question doctrine as a separation of powers
principle explains the result in two recent district court cases, Dyer v. Blair, 390 F.
Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ill. 1975), and Trombetta v. Florida, 353 F. Supp. 575 (M.D. Fla.
1973), two cases involving state legislative voting procedures for amendment ratifica-
tion. Because the issues were ones of federalism and not separation of powers, the
political question doctrine was irrelevant.
68. 369 U.S. at 217.
69. See, e.g., Edler, Article V, Justiciability, and The Equal Rights Amend-
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fled these factors as signals for the potential presence of a
political question in a given case and not determinative
criteria for all cases. 0 The common thread underlying these
factors is that they serve to identify a potential conflict be-
tween the exercise of judicial review and the constitutional
powers of another branch of government. It is the confronta-
tion between the judiciary and another branch of government
created by the exercise of judicial review over the actions of
the other branch which lies at the root of any political ques-
tion. As said in Baker, the doctrine is "essentially a function
of the separation of powers."'"
The Supreme Court's application of the political question
doctrine since Baker demonstrates that the Baker criteria are
not mechanical formulations, but simply descriptive of recur-
ring characteristics which indicate a potential separation of
powers issue. For example, application of the "textually de-
monstrable commitment" factor to the provision of article I,
section 5, that "[e]ach House shall be the Judge of the Elec-
tions, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members ... "
would certainly lead to the conclusion that controversies over
the qualifications of members of Congress were committed to
each House and, consequently, were non-justiciable. Yet, the
Supreme Court held just the opposite in Powell v.
McCormack.71
While acknowledging the Baker factors, the Court in
Powell held that the judiciary must first determine the mean-
ing of the Constitution before ascertaining whether the Con-
stitution committed a particular power to another branch.73
Through engaging in this inquiry, the Court, in essence, ruled
ment, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 63, 96-97 (1978); Ginsburg, Ratification of the Equal Rights
Amendment: A Question of Time, 57 TEx. L. REV. 919, 943 (1979); Kanowitz and
Klinger, Can a State Rescind Its Equal Rights Amendment Ratification: Who De-
cides and How?, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 995-99 (1977); Comment, Constitutional
Amendments-The Justiciability of Ratification and Retraction, 41 TENN. L. REV.
93, 106-10 (1973); Note, Reversals in the Federal Constitutional Amendment Pro-
cess: Efficacy of State Ratifications of the Equal Rights Amendment, 49 IND. L.J.
147, 156-59 (1973); Note, The Equal Rights Amendment: Will States Be Allowed to
Change Their Minds?, 49"NOTRE DAME LAW. 657, 666-68 (1974).
70. As Professor Strum observed, "Any student of the Court can demolish this
list by pointing out cases in which all of these criteria have been present, and that
were nonetheless decided by the Court." P. STRUM, supra note 56, at 63.
71. 369 U.S. at 217.
72. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
73. Id. at 519.
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upon the merits of the case. By answering the broader ques-
tion of whether the action was within the constitutional power
of another branch, the Court was also required to answer the
narrower inquiry of whether the exercise of that power was
lawful.
Thus, in Powell, the Court found that article I, section 5,
only granted Congress the power to decide if members were
duly elected and met the criteria for age, residence, and citi-
zenship established elsewhere in the Constitution.' Upon as-
certaining what power was committed to Congress, the result
on the merits was also clear. Indeed, the Court explicitly rec-
ognized that its political question analysis controlled the out-
come on the merits.75
More recently, in Goldwater v. Carter7 6 the Court dis-
cussed the applicability of the political question doctrine to a
case involving the right of the Senate to participate in the ter-
mination of a treaty. The plurality opinion of Justice Rehn-
quist found that the political question doctrine barred consid-
eration of the case." Justice Rehnquist relied upon Coleman
v. Miller; like article V's silence on rescission or ratification
following rejection, the Constitution was silent on the issue of
the termination of a treaty.78 Nowhere, however, did Justice
Rehnquist refer to Baker or its factors. Justice Powell, on the
other hand, applied the Baker factors and found that inter-
pretation of the Senate's treaty powers under article II, sec-
tion 2, would resolve both the political question issue and the
merits of the case.79
The mechanistic application of the Baker factors was
most confused by Justice Brennan's Goldwater dissent. As in
Powell, Justice Brennan found the case did not involve a po-
litical question. Instead, he believed that the issue was con-
trolled by the doctrine which grants the President the sole
power to recognize foreign governments.8 0 This further con-
fused the utility of the Baker factors because in Baker Justice
74. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2-3.
75. 395 U.S. at 549.
76. 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
77. Id. at 1002-03.
78. Id. at 1003.
79. Id. at 998-1000 (Powell, J., concurring). He went on to find, however, that
the controversy was not ripe for judicial review.
80. Id. at 1007.
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Brennan, writing the majority opinion, listed cases involving
this same principle of executive power to recognize foreign
governments, as examples of political questions."'
The Court's handling of the political question doctrine
since Baker indicates that the fundamental inquiry is whether
the principle of separation of powers is implicated in a partic-
ular case. The Baker factors are useful guideposts in ascer-
taining the existence of a separation of powers issue, but are
not determinative on the ultimate issue of whether or not a
case presents a non-justiciable political question. The answer
to this inquiry alone, however, is not determinative. If it were
so, then judicial review itself would have no foundation, for
routine cases of judicial review over ordinary legislation impli-
cates separation of powers to some degree. Instead, some ad-
ditional factor militating for an extraordinary need for judicial
restraint must also be present. The Baker factors give some
indication of the types of cases where that need exists. Those
factors, however, are descriptive. It thus must be determined
if some additional factor exists requiring the application of
the political question doctrine to article V cases.
VI. ARTICLE V AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS
Recognizing the political question doctrine as an aspect of
the separation of powers goes a long way toward determining
whether cases under article V are not justiciable. The first
step in deciding whether the doctrine applies to article V
cases is determining whether adjudication of an article V case
involves a potential conflict with another branch of govern-
ment. As stated previously, such a conflict is necessarily
presented whenever a proposed amendment is intended to af-
fect a prior Supreme Court constitutional interpretation. By
controlling the amendment process through the adjudication
of cases, the Court retains for itself the power to frustrate the
amendment effort and leaves the judicial review power un-
checked. As indicated by Justice Powell in Goldwater 2 and
by Professor Scharpf,8 3 it is entirely appropriate for the Court
to abstain from such a case through the invocation of the po-
litical question doctrine. The consequences of ruling in such
81. 369 U.S. at 211-13.
82. 444 U.S. at 996.
83. Scharpf, supra note 60, at 517.
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cases could be serious indeed for the legitimacy of the Court
in a republican government of separated powers."' A ruling by
the Court which blocks a proposed amendment aimed at over-
turning a prior decision of the Court leaves Congress and the
public with no option but to accept the Court's ruling. Such a
result would do violence to the notion of popular sovereignty,
which, as noted by Alexander Hamilton, is the stream from
which legitimate national power ought to flow."
Both the framers of the Constitution and the Supreme
Court have expressed the view that the amendment process of
article V is an important instrument of popular sovereignty.
In the debates on article V, Hamilton expressed the view that
"the people would finally decide in the case" of proposed
amendments.8 6 In Dillon v. Gloss, Justice Van Devanter ob-
served that "amendments must have the sanction of the peo-
ple" and that ratification is an "expression of the people's will
.... In United States v. Sprague, the Court held that arti-
cle V is a grant of authority by the people to Congress." Pro-
fessor Bickel has gone even further and suggested that judicial
review in general weakens democratic principles by showing
distrust of the legislature. 8
Allowing the least republican branch to review cases in-
volving amendments intended to overrule that branch's opin-
ions gives the Court the unchecked power to thwart those ef-
forts. This is contrary to the notions of popular sovereignty
contained in article V and inherent in the entire Constitution.
It is also contrary to article V itself, which, according to
Madison, allows for "useful alterations [which] will be sug-
gested by experience [and which] could not be foreseen."90
Application of the political question doctrine in such cases of
present conflict is a forthright recognition of the Court's role
as a co-equal branch of government. It is also a recognition of
the ability of Congress and the public to change the Constitu-
tion in reaction to the Court's interpretations.
Where there is no present conflict, however, a different
84. P. STRUM, supra note 56, at 103.
85. The Federalist No. 22 (A. Hamilton).
86. J. MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 692-93 (Scott ed. 1898).
87. 256 U.S. 368, 374 (1921).
88. 282 U.S. 716, 733 (1931).
89. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 21 (1962).
90. The Federalist No. 43 (J. Madison).
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consideration is involved. Since the initial inquiry is always
the existence of a potential conflict with Congress, the Court
would not be barred from enforcing a prior Congressional
judgment. Indeed, the Supreme Court followed such a course
in Leser, Sprague, and, to a lesser extent, in Coleman. If, for
example, Congress were to enact a statute governing the con-
duct of a constitutional convention9 ' or the effect of rescis-
sions,9" there would be no conflict with Congress if the Court
were to apply such a law to an appropriate article V case. In
such a circumstance, the Court would be free to interpret and
apply such a law without fear of generating a separation of
powers issue.
Where, however, Congress has not previously made a
judgment on a particular article V issue, a potential for con-
flict arises even when the underlying proposed amendment is
not directed at a prior opinion of the Court. A decision by the
Court in such cases has the potential for limiting congres-
sional power in future amendment efforts. Because a decision
in a case of potential conflict would not show a "lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government," one of the
Baker factors, 3 the Court may feel less constrained in ad-
dressing the merits of the case. If, however, judicial restraint
is appropriate in cases of direct conflict, under the political
question doctrine, there appears no basis for distinguishing
cases of potential conflict through any interpretation of the
political question doctrine or article V. Without such a princi-
pled mode of distinction, the existence of potential conflict in
cases of future amendment efforts militates in favor of the ap-
plication of the political question doctrine in those cases as
well.
Such an approach, however, has been criticized as going
too far toward restraining judicial power, resulting in no check
91. Such proposals have been considered by Congress in the past. See, e.g., Er-
vin, Proposed Legislation to Implement the Convention Method of Amending the
Constitution, 66 MIcH. L. REV. 875 (1968); Note, Proposed Legislation on the Con-
vention Method of Amending the United States Constitution, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1612
(1972).
92. Congress has rejected legislation to permit rescission in the past. See, e.g.,
124 CONG. REC. 8658 (daily ed. Aug. 15, 1978); id. at §§ 16934-16935, 16987, 17015-
17026 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1978); S.1272, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S.215, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971); S.623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); S.2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967).
93. 369 U.S. at 217.
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upon congressional authority.94 Without such a check, these
commentators maintain that Congress can abuse its powers.
For example, Congress can propose an amendment and imme-
diately declare it ratified before the states have considered the
amendment.9 This view has two shortcomings. First, it as-
sumes that Congress would intentionally violate article V for
political expediency. While Congress is certainly capable of
doing so, intentional violation of the Constitution is hardly
something which Congress can be expected to do lightly."
Second, it ignores the fact that political checks exist on Con-
gress through the ballot box, which do not play a role in the
judiciary. A Congress which intentionally violates article V is
subject to the ultimate sanction of voter disapproval.9
VII. Carmen v. Idaho9 5-THE ERA CASE.
Carmen v. Idaho, involved the validity of attempted
rescissions of ERA ratifications and the validity of the con-
gressional extension of the ratification period. It would seem
to be a clear example of a case involving a direct, present con-
flict between judicial review and separation of powers. The ef-
fect of the ERA would have been to overrule the Court's ap-
plication of the equal protection clause to cases of sex
discrimination. While the Supreme Court has applied equal
protection analysis to gender discrimination cases, it has
never elevated sex to the status of a suspect class.9 9 Both Con-
gress and members of the Supreme Court acknowledged that
ratification of the ERA would affect the level of scrutiny re-
quired in cases of gender discrimination.100 A dispute over the
mechanics of the amendment process for the ERA placed the
94. See supra note 60.
95. Comment, supra note 57 at 923-25.
96. To the contrary, Congress has undertaken novel actions, such as extension
of the ERA ratification period, only after serious debate over the legality of such an
action. See generally, Hearings On S.J. Res. 134 Before the Subcomm. on the Consti-
tution of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); Hear-
ings on H.J. Res. 638 Before The Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
97. Of course, if the public were to favor the proposed amendment, there would
be no need for Congress to circumvent article V.
98. 103 S. Ct. 22 (1982).
99. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973).
100. See, e.g., Hearings on S.J. Res. 134, supra note 96, at 282-83; Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. at 691-92 (Powell, J., concurring).
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judiciary squarely in the position of exerting control over the
process designated to overrule the Supreme Court's earlier de-
cisions. Even under the more narrow view of the role of the
political question doctrine in article V cases suggested by Jus-
tice Powell in Goldwater and by Professor Scharpf, Idaho
seemed a logical case for the application of the political ques-
tion doctrine.
The district court, however, felt otherwise.10' The district
court recognized that a question of separation of powers was
presented by the plaintiffs' request that the judiciary invali-
date Congress' actions. It fell prey however, to the mechanis-
tic application of the Baker factors. The court used an analy-
sis similar to the one employed in Powell v. McCormack. It
found that there was no textually demonstrable commitment
of these matters to Congress. Since the issues, according to
the district court, were not committed to Congress, the court
had little trouble disposing of the remaining factors; by de-
fault, the case must therefore be one for the judiciary. More-
over, because the district court viewed the issues of extension
and rescission as questions of constitutional power, they could
be susceptible of only one answer, and thus were justiciable.
Shortly after the district court's ruling, the Supreme
Court agreed to hear the case.'0 The Court, however, was not
required to address the issue of the applicability of the politi-
cal question doctrine because an equally effective and less
controversial justiciability doctrine soon became available.
The extended ratification period for the ERA passed on June
30, 1982 without the necessary three-fourths of the states rati-
fying prior to the Court's full consideration of the case. Thus,
the Court was able to dismiss the case as moot.
The Court's handling of the case, however, indicated that
it intended to allow the political processes to proceed to their
conclusion without judicial interference. The Court first de-
nied the Solicitor General's motion to immediately vacate the
district court's judgment without further argument or brief-
ing. The Court's basis for the denial was that the case would
not become ripe until three-fourths of the states had ratified
the ERA.103 The Court thus declined to enter the controversy
101. Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. 1107 (D. Idaho 1981).
102. Petitions for certiorari before judgment were granted on January 25, 1982.
See National Organization for Women v. Idaho, 102 S. Ct. 1273 (1982).
103. 102 S. Ct. 1045 (1982); 102 S. Ct. 1272 (1982); 102 S. Ct. 1273 (1982).
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during the ratification period.
Simultaneously, however, the Supreme Court, sua sponte,
took the unusual step of staying the district court's declara-
tory judgment pending review of the entire case by the Su-
preme Court. 04 The Court thus removed any legal impedi-
ment to further deliberation by the states on the ratification
of the ERA. Having freed the political process from immedi-
ate judicial review or control, the Court allowed itself the op-
portunity of not addressing the case at all by permitting the
passage of time to moot the controversy.
The Supreme Court's handling of Idaho can only be seen
as an exercise in judicial restraint. This restraint could be
viewed simply as an application of the Court's long-standing
practice of deciding constitutional issues only when there is a
strict necessity for their resolution.105 Such an explanation,
however, does not explain the Court's decision to stay the
lower court's declaratory judgment. That action can only be
viewed as a conscious decision of the Court to allow the politi-
cal processes to continue free of judicial interference. Such an
action bears some similarity to the political question doctrine
itself, which also relegates certain issues and processes to the
political branches free from judicial influence or control.
VIII. CONCLUSION
At no time in history has the Supreme Court ever invali-
dated a constitutional amendment or overruled a congres-
sional action taken during the amendment process. For it ever
to do so, or even assert the power to do so, would engender a
most serious conflict between its role as the arbiter of the
meaning of the Constitution and its role as a coordinate
branch of government in a system of separation of powers.
The assertion of such power would leave the Court's authority
to define the Constitution unchecked, a result at odds with
the system of government created by the Constitution. Recog-
nition of the consequences of this result compels the conclu-
sion that the judiciary should refrain from constitutional
amendment cases through the political question doctrine.
104. 102 S. Ct. 1272; 102 S. Ct. 1273.
105. See, e.g., Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549 (1947).
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